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Device-independent quantum private comparison protocol without a third party
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Since unconditionally secure quantum two-party computations are known to be impossible, most
existing quantum private comparison (QPC) protocols adopted a third party. Recently, we proposed
a QPC protocol which involves two parties only, and showed that although it is not unconditionally
secure, it only leaks an extremely small amount of information to the other party. Here we further
propose the device-independent version of the protocol, so that it can be more convenient and
dependable in practical applications.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Mn, 03.67.Ac, 03.65.Ta
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography has
caught great interests recently [1–7]. It aims to replace
the model of the physical devices used in cryptographic
protocols with physically testable assumptions, e.g., the
certification of nonlocality. Thus the devices can be
treated as black boxes that produce outputs correlated
with some inputs. This brings the advantage that the
assumptions needed to guarantee the security of the pro-
tocol can be significantly reduced, so that the knowledge
of the internal workings of the devices is not required.
The protocol remains reliable even if the devices are pro-
vided by the adversary. Such a higher degree of security
makes DI protocols more dependable in practical appli-
cations than traditional quantum cryptography.
Currently, most existing DI protocols focused on quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [1–7] and related tasks [8],
where all legitimate participants always collaborate hon-
estly against the attack of external cheaters. On the other
hand, as pointed out in Ref. [9], DI two-party cryptog-
raphy remains a largely unexplored territory, as very few
researches were dedicated to multi-party secure compu-
tation problems, where the legitimate participants do not
trust each other since some of them may cheat. To our
best knowledge, Refs. [9–15] are the only references on
this field so far, which studied quantum bit commitment,
quantum coin tossing, weak string erasure, and position
verification.
In this paper, we will take the first step towards the DI
solution of another multi-party secure computation prob-
lem – quantum private comparison (QPC), a.k.a. the so-
cialist millionaire problem [16]. The goal of QPC is to
compare two secret numbers a and b of two parties Alice
and Bob, respectively, so that they finally learn whether
a and b are equal, without revealing any extra informa-
tion on their values (other than what can be inferred from
the comparison result) to the other party. As a typical
example of multi-party secure computations, QPC plays
essential roles in cryptography, with many applications
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in e-commerce and data mining.
As it is well-known, unconditionally secure quantum
two-party secure computations are impossible [17–22],
i.e., the dishonest party can always obtain a non-trivial
amount of information on the secret data of the other
party. QPC is also covered. To circumvent the problem,
almost all existing QPC protocols ([23–39] and the refer-
ences therein) added a third party to help Alice and Bob
accomplish the comparison. The protocol in Ref. [40] is
a rare exception, in which such a third party is absent.
But it was later found to be completely insecure [41, 42]
because the entire secret data of the honest party will
always be exposed to the other party.
Very recently, we proposed a device-dependent (DD)
QPC protocol which involves two parties only [43], and
showed that the average amount of information leaked
to the dishonest party can be as low as 14 bits for any
length of the bit-string being compared. Therefore, de-
spite that the protocol is not unconditionally secure, the
performance is quite good, and this is achieved without
relying on the third party. Here we will further upgrade
the protocol to the device-independent (DI) version, so
that it can enjoy even better security and versatility in
practical applications.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
our previous DD protocol will be briefly reviewed. Then
in section 3, it will be turned into the DI version, with
its security analyzed in section 4.
II. THE DD PROTOCOL
Let H(x) be a classical hash function which is a 1-to-
1 mapping between the n-bit strings x and y = H(x)
(i.e., H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n). Denote the two orthogonal
states of a qubit as |0〉0 and |1〉0, respectively, and define
|0〉1 ≡ (|0〉0 + |1〉0)/
√
2, |1〉1 ≡ (|0〉0− |1〉0)/
√
2. That is,
the subscript σ = 0, 1 in |γ〉σ stands for two incompati-
ble measurement bases, while γ = 0, 1 distinguishes the
two states in the same basis. In Ref. [43], the following
protocol was proposed.
The DD QPC Protocol (for comparing Alice’s n-bit
string a ≡ a1a2...an and Bob’s n-bit string b ≡ b1b2...bn):
2(1) Using the hash function H(x), Alice calculates the
n-bit string hA ≡ hA1 hA2 ...hAn = H(a), and Bob calculates
the n-bit string hB ≡ hB1 hB2 ...hBn = H(b).
(2) From i = 1 to n, Alice and Bob compare hA and
hB bit-by-bit as follows.
If i is odd, then:
(2.1A) Alice randomly picks a bit γAi ∈ {0, 1}
and sends Bob a qubit in the state
∣∣γAi
〉
hA
i
.
(2.2A) Bob measures it in the hBi basis and
obtains the result
∣∣γBi
〉
hB
i
. He announces γBi while keep-
ing hBi secret.
(2.3A) Alice announces γAi .
If i is even, then:
(2.1B) Bob randomly picks a bit γBi ∈ {0, 1}
and sends Alice a qubit in the state
∣∣γBi
〉
hB
i
.
(2.2B) Alice measures it in the hAi basis and
obtains the result
∣∣γAi
〉
hA
i
. She announces γAi while keep-
ing hAi secret.
(2.3B) Bob announces γBi .
(2.4) If γAi 6= γBi , then they conclude that a 6= b,
and abort the protocol immediately without comparing
the rest bits of hA and hB. Otherwise they continue with
the next i.
(3) If Alice and Bob find γAi = γ
B
i for all i = 1, ..., n
then they conclude that a = b.
Note that in the protocol, we compare the hash func-
tions hA and hB instead of the secret strings a and b
themselves. The purpose is to change the information
leaked to the other party from direct information into
mutual information on a and b. It will not change the
total amount of information leaked.
III. THE DI PROTOCOL
In each round of step (2) of the above protocol, hAi
and hBi are compared in a non-entangled way. That is,
one party (e.g., Alice) prepares a qubit in the hAi ba-
sis, then the other party (e.g., Bob) measures it in the
hBi basis. This can be replaced with the following en-
tangled method. Alice prepares the Bell state |Φ+〉 =
(|0〉0 |0〉0+ |1〉0 |1〉0)/
√
2 = (|0〉1 |0〉1+ |1〉1 |1〉1)/
√
2. She
keeps the first qubit and sends Bob the second one. Then
they measure their qubits in the hAi or h
B
i basis, respec-
tively. Obviously, when hAi = h
B
i , their measurement re-
sults will always be equal, while if hAi 6= hBi , their results
will be different with probability 1/2. Thus the resultant
protocol is equivalent to our original DD protocol.
In DI cryptography, Bell states can further be replaced
by pairs of devices called nonlocal boxes, which can be
supplied by either Alice or Bob, or even other untrusty
parties. These devices can be treated as DI black boxes
that take inputs and produce outputs, without the need
nor the possibility to check how they work internally.
Each of Alice’s (Bob’s) boxes has four inputs S
(0)
A , S
(1)
A ,
S
(2)
A , and S
(3)
A (S
(0)
B , S
(1)
B , S
(2)
B , and S
(3)
B ). For each input,
Alice’s (Bob’s) box can product either of the two outputs
γ
(k)
A = ±1 (γ(k)B = ±1), k = 0, 1, 2, 3. When the boxes
are manufactured honestly, they should act exactly like
|Φ+〉. For example, if we treat |0〉0 and |1〉0 (|0〉1 and|1〉1) as the eigenstates of the Pauli operator σz (σx), then
an honest implementation of such a DI box pair can be
realized using the Bell state |Φ+〉 itself, with the inputs
of the box at Alice’s or Bob’s side being implemented
with the measurements on her or his qubit, respectively,
as [13]
S
(0)
A = S
(0)
B = σz ,
S
(1)
A = S
(1)
B = σx,
S
(2)
A = S
(2)
B = (σz + σx)/
√
2,
S
(3)
A = S
(3)
B = (σz − σx)/
√
2. (1)
Define the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) polyno-
mials [3]
C1 =
〈
γ
(2)
A γ
(0)
B
〉
+
〈
γ
(2)
A γ
(1)
B
〉
+
〈
γ
(3)
A γ
(0)
B
〉
−
〈
γ
(3)
A γ
(1)
B
〉
(2)
and
C2 =
〈
γ
(0)
A γ
(2)
B
〉
+
〈
γ
(1)
A γ
(2)
B
〉
+
〈
γ
(0)
A γ
(3)
B
〉
−
〈
γ
(1)
A γ
(3)
B
〉
,
(3)
where the correlator
〈
γ
(k1)
A γ
(k2)
B
〉
is defined as the prob-
ability Pr(γ
(k1)
A = γ
(k2)
B )−Pr(γ(k1)A 6= γ(k2)B ). If the boxes
work as they were claimed, then the CHSH values should
reach the point of maximal quantum violation of the
CHSH Bell inequality, i.e., C1 = C2 = 2
√
2. Also, when
Alice and Bob choose the same input S(0) (or S(1)) for a
pair of the boxes, they should always obtain maximally
correlated outputs γ
(0)
A = γ
(0)
B (or γ
(1)
A = γ
(1)
B ). On the
contrary, for local boxes which have fixed output values
without displaying any nonlocal correlation, the CHSH
values will satisfy the CHSH Bell inequality C1 ≤ 2 and
C2 ≤ 2.
Also, like other DI cryptographic protocols (e.g., [2,
3, 5]), it is assumed that Alice’s and Bob’s locations are
secure, in the sense that no unwanted information can
leak out to the outside. Thus one party cannot know the
other’s inputs and outputs to the DI boxes, unless the
latter party announces them.
With such nonlocal boxes, our protocol can be turned
into the following DI version.
The DI QPC Protocol (for comparing Alice’s n-bit
string a ≡ a1a2...an and Bob’s n-bit string b ≡ b1b2...bn):
(A) The check mode: Alice and Bob share many pairs
of DI boxes and check them as follows.
(i) Alice randomly chooses some of them, asking
Bob to randomly pick inputs into his boxes and announce
both his inputs and outputs, then she randomly picks
inputs into her boxes and records the outputs.
3(ii) Bob randomly chooses another portion of the
box pairs, asking Alice to randomly pick inputs into her
boxes and announce both her inputs and outputs, then
he randomly picks inputs into his boxes and records the
outputs.
In both (i) and (ii), each of them check whether
they have correlated outputs when they picked the same
inputs S(0) or S(1) for the boxes of the same pair, and use
the outputs they obtained when picking different inputs
to check whether the CHSH values C1 and C2 violate the
CHSH Bell inequality.
(B) The compare mode: Alice and Bob randomly pick
some of the rest unchecked pairs of boxes to continue
with the following steps.
(1) Using the hash function H(x), Alice calculates
the n-bit string hA ≡ hA1 hA2 ...hAn = H(a), and Bob cal-
culates the n-bit string hB ≡ hB1 hB2 ...hBn = H(b).
(2) From i = 1 to n, Alice and Bob compare hA
and hB bit-by-bit as follows.
If i is odd, then:
(2.1A) Alice randomly picks a DI box,
inputs S
(hA
i
)
A and records the output γ
(hA
i
)
A . Then she
tells Bob which one she picked.
(2.2A) Bob inputs S
(hB
i
)
B into his corre-
sponding box from the same pair and obtains the output
γ
(hB
i
)
B . He announces γ
(hB
i
)
B while keeping S
(hB
i
)
B secret.
(2.3A) Alice announces γ
(hA
i
)
A .
If i is even, then:
(2.1B) Bob randomly picks a DI box, in-
puts S
(hB
i
)
B and records the output γ
(hB
i
)
B . Then he tells
Alice which one he picked.
(2.2B) Alice inputs S
(hA
i
)
A into her cor-
responding box and obtains the output γ
(hA
i
)
A . She an-
nounces γ
(hA
i
)
A while keeping S
(hA
i
)
A secret.
(2.3B) Bob announces γ
(hB
i
)
B .
(2.4) If γ
(hA
i
)
A 6= γ(h
B
i
)
B , then they conclude
that a 6= b and abort the protocol immediately without
comparing the rest bits of hA and hB. Otherwise they
continue with the next i.
(3) If Alice and Bob find γ
(hA
i
)
A = γ
(hB
i
)
B for all
i = 1, ..., n then they conclude that a = b.
For clarity, in the above description we wrote the check
mode and the compare mode separately. But for bet-
ter security, the two modes should actually be mixed to-
gether. That is, Alice and Bob choose some DI boxes
to run the check mode first, and they choose one of the
unchecked DI box and shift to the compare mode to com-
pare one bit of hA and hB. Then they choose some other
DI boxes and run the check mode again, followed by an-
other round of the compare mode to compare the next bit
of hA and hB, and so on. The times for shifting modes
are decided randomly by both parties in turns. Other-
wise, if the compare mode is run only after the check
mode is completed, the provider of the DI boxes may
cheat by building a secret timer into each box, so that
they all act honestly like the entangled state |Φ+〉 during
the check mode, then switch to some kinds of cheating
mode (e.g., giving fixed outputs regardless the input val-
ues) automatically at the time when the compare mode
is expected to begin.
Also, it is important that in step (2.1A) (step (2.1B)),
Alice (Bob) should finish input to her (his) box and
record the output before telling the other party which
box is picked. Otherwise, if she (he) announces which
box is picked first, and postpone the input/output pro-
cess to step (2.3) after the other party completed the
input/output in step (2.2), then it could also bring secu-
rity problems. That is, if the other party is dishonest and
he provides the DI boxes, he may build a remote control
into each box, so that they usually act like real nonlocal
boxes that can certainly pass the CHSH inequality check.
But when he knows which box is picked for the compare
mode, he engages the remote control to turn the box
into the cheating mode which gives a fixed output that
known to himself beforehand, so that he can cheat with
the method that we will describe below in the paragraph
before Theorem 1.
IV. SECURITY
Since unconditionally secure QPC is impossible when
only two parties are involved, we does not attempt to
make the information leaked in our protocol arbitrarily
close to 0. Instead, our goal is merely to make it stay at a
low level. That is, the cheating we are going to deal with
is how the dishonest Alice/Bob tries to increase his/her
information on the other’s secret data.
There is surely no security problem to consider when
a = b, because both parties naturally know the secret
data of each other from the comparison result. Now let
us study the case when the protocol outputs a 6= b.
An important feature of our protocol is that, if it
aborts after running m (1 ≤ m ≤ n) rounds of step (2),
the last n −m bits of hA and hB will not be compared
any more. They will not be input into the DI boxes, or
enter the protocol in any other form at all. Thus it is
obvious that these bits remain completely secret to the
other party. As a consequence, the amount of mutual
information leaked to each party is m bits at the most.
Therefore, the goal of a dishonest party is to increase
m. To do so, he/she has to make the protocol abort as
late as possible. Without loss of generality, let us assume
that Alice cheats, and suppose that she prepares and
supplies all the DI boxes, which is a case that benefits her
the most so that we can obtain a general upper bound of
the successful cheating probability.
It is easy for Alice to cheat in each of the odd rounds,
because in step (2.3A) she can always announce γ
(hA
i
)
A =
γ
(hB
i
)
B even if the actual result is γ
(hA
i
)
A 6= γ(h
B
i
)
B . This
ensures that the protocol will never abort at these rounds.
4But in each of the rest k ≡ m/2 even rounds among the
first m rounds of step (2), she is required to announce
γ
(hA
i
)
A in step (2.2B) before Bob announces γ
(hB
i
)
B in step
(2.3B). Since she wishes to announce a value that satisfies
γ
(hA
i
)
A = γ
(hB
i
)
B so that the protocol will not abort, she
needs to guess the γ
(hB
i
)
B value that Bob will obtain from
his DI box. Now let us prove that the probability pguess
for her to make a correct guess cannot equal exactly to
1.
Theorem 1. If all of Bob’s DI boxes always give the
same output γ
(0)
B = γ
(1)
B no matter he inputs S
(0)
B or S
(1)
B ,
then they cannot pass the CHSH inequality check.
Proof. Recall that step (ii) of the check mode re-
quires Alice to announce both her inputs and outputs
to a DI box when Bob has not input anything into his
corresponding box yet. Therefore, for these boxes, Al-
ice cannot monitor Bob’s announced values of his γ
(0)
B ’s
and γ
(1)
B ’s first, then to fake her output values γ
(2)
A ’s and
γ
(3)
A ’s to make them pass the CHSH inequality check.
Consequently, if all boxes give γ
(0)
B = γ
(1)
B , there will be〈
γ
(2)
A γ
(0)
B
〉
=
〈
γ
(2)
A γ
(1)
B
〉
and
〈
γ
(3)
A γ
(0)
B
〉
=
〈
γ
(3)
A γ
(1)
B
〉
.
Substituting them into Eq. (2), we immediately obtain
C1 = 2
〈
γ
(2)
A γ
(0)
B
〉
≤ 2, (4)
which is far below the correct expected value 2
√
2. Con-
sequently, when Bob checks the C1 value given by the
boxes picked in step (ii), he will catch Alice cheating.
This ends the proof.
Of course, dishonest Alice does not have to make all of
Bob’s DI boxes always give the same output γ
(0)
B = γ
(1)
B .
She can mix a small number of such boxes with real non-
local boxes (i.e., these act exactly like |Φ+〉). With this
method, the corresponding CHSH value C1 may merely
deviate slightly from 2
√
2, so that the cheating could be
covered by statistical fluctuation. But then it is obvi-
ous that once Bob randomly picks a box in step (2.1B),
this box does not necessarily be one of these which give
fixed output γ
(0)
B = γ
(1)
B regardless Bob’s input. Once
Bob picks a box whose output γ
(hB
i
)
B depends on his in-
put S
(hB
i
)
B , the no-signaling principle prevents Alice from
knowing γ
(hB
i
)
B with certainty before Bob announces it.
Thus Theorem 1 leads us to the following conclusion.
Corollary. In step (2.2B), the probability pguess for
dishonest Alice to make a correct guess on the output
value γ
(hB
i
)
B that Bob will announce in step (2.3B) cannot
equal to 1.
In this case, the upper bound of the average amount of
information on Bob’s secret data b that leaked to Alice is
calculated as follows. Continue with the analysis before
Theorem 1. As Alice has probability pguess to make a
correct guess on Bob’s γ
(hB
i
)
B , she can announce γ
(hA
i
)
A =
γ
(hB
i
)
B in step (2.2B), so that in each of the first k even
rounds there is probability pguess that the protocol will
not abort. Consequently, the probability for the protocol
to abort at the mth round (i.e., it happens to continue
for the first k − 1 even rounds while aborts at the k-th
even round) is
pmabort = p
k−1
guess(1− pguess). (5)
That is, with probability pmabort the protocol will abort
at the mth round, and dishonest Alice will know nothing
about the rest n − m bits of Bob’s hash value, so that
she learns m bits of information at the most. Also, with
probability p
[n/2]
guess the protocol does not aborts until all
bits are compared (here [n/2] means the integer part of
n/2). In this case she learns all the n bits. Summing
over all possible m values and recall that m = 2k (as
the protocol will not abort at the odd rounds when Alice
cheats), the average amount of mutual information leaked
to dishonest Alice is bounded by
IA =
[n/2]∑
k=1
m× pmabort + n× p[n/2]guess
=
[n/2]∑
k=1
2k × pk−1guess(1− pguess) + n× p[n/2]guess. (6)
Note that this is merely a upper bound, as we have not
considered the cases where dishonest Alice cannot even
escape the detection in the check mode. That is, Alice
may reach this bound only if her DI boxes can pass the
check mode with the maximum probability 1.
When taking into consideration the probability for
Alice to pass the check mode, the maximum value of
pguess will also be bounded. But calculating the exact
bound could be complicated, because the CHSH values
are merely statistical results. In practice we cannot ex-
pect to find C1 = C2 = 2
√
2 exactly. Some statistical
fluctuation has to be allowed. Noise and manufacture
imperfections of the experimental devices could also af-
fected the actual outcome of the CHSH values. Thus it
is hard to obtain a general result without knowing the
specific performance of the experimental devices used for
the implementation of the protocol. Here, take for ex-
ample, let us follow Ref. [6] to take C1, C2 ≥ 2.5 as
acceptable values, and neglect the noise and device im-
perfections. In this case, suppose that Alice prepares 61%
of the DI boxes as real nonlocal boxes (which have the
theoretical expected values C1 = C2 = 2
√
2), while the
rest 39% boxes are prepared as local boxes which will
produce fixed output values known beforehand to her-
self regardless Bob’s input (which have C1 = C2 = 2).
Then the theoretical expected average CHSH values will
be 61% × 2√2 + 39% × 2 ≃ 2.505, so that she stands a
5FIG. 1: The probability pmabort for the protocol to abort at
the mth round when Alice cheats and pguess = 0.91.
nontrivial probability to pass the check mode. The lo-
cal boxes enable Alice to guess Bob’s output γ
(hB
i
)
B with
probability 1. But for the real nonlocal boxes, as shown
in Eq. (5) of Ref. [43], the maximum probability for her
to guess Bob’s output is pmax = cos
2(pi/8) ≃ 0.8536. In
this case we have
pguess = 61%× 0.8536 + 39%× 1 ≃ 0.91. (7)
In Fig.1 we take pguess = 0.91 and show the probability
for the protocol to abort at exactly the mth round (i.e.,
pmabort in Eq. (5)) when Alice cheats. We can see that
most of the time the protocol will abort very soon. Thus
the corresponding amount of information leaked will be
small. The cases that the protocol can last many rounds
will occur with extremely small probabilities only. There-
fore, there is very low chances that dishonest Alice can
gain a large amount of information on Bob’s secret data.
Fig. 2 shows the average amount of information leaked
to Alice (i.e., IA in Eq. (6)) as a function of the length
n of the bit-strings a and b being compared. We can see
that IA never excesses 23 bits for any length n of a and
b when pguess = 0.91. It is a little higher than that of
the DD version, whose upper bound of the amount of
information leaked to Alice is 14 bits, as proven in Ref.
[43]. This is because in the DI protocol, 39% of the DI
boxes can be local boxes which give fixed outputs, so that
dishonest Alice’s pguess can go beyond the pmax in the DD
version. But we should note that both 23 bits (for the DI
protocol) and 14 bits (for the DD protocol) are merely
loose upper bounds. This is because, as elaborated in
Ref. [43], when dishonest Alice saturates the maximum
probability pmax for guessing Bob’s output γ
(hB
i
)
B in the
DD protocol, there is no known method for her to learn
Bob’s input S
(hB
i
)
B with probability 1. Thus she cannot
gain exactly m bits of information on hB (and therefore
Bob’s string b) when the protocol aborts in themth round
of step (2). The same thing is also true for the local
boxes. That is, while they can enable Alice to guess Bob’s
output γ
(hB
i
)
B with probability 1, they cannot provide her
the information on Bob’s input S
(hB
i
)
B any more. It is
FIG. 2: The average amount of information leaked IA to dis-
honest Alice as a function of the length n of the bit-strings
that they compare.
worth studying what will be the tight upper bounds of
the information leaked in both the DD and DI protocols.
For illustration purposes, in Fig. 2 we also plotted IA
as a function of n when pguess = 0.99. It shows that IA
never excesses 200 bits for any length n even for such
a high pguess value. Considering that most data we use
in real applications nowadays are generally at the size of
megabytes to gigabytes, leaking only 200 bits is not seri-
ous at all. We would also like to emphasize that there is
no known method to create DI boxes which can pass the
CHSH test with a nontrivial probability while reaching
pguess = 0.99 simultaneously. But even if such “black
magic” exists, our result shows that the security level of
the DI QPC protocol is still quite acceptable.
From the symmetry of the protocol, it is trivial to show
that the same conclusion also applies if Bob (instead of
Alice) cheats.
V. SUMMARY
Thus we showed that although our DI QPC protocol
is not unconditionally secure, the average of the amount
of information leaked to the dishonest party is very low,
and it has a fixed upper bound for any length of the
secret strings being compared. Also, the elimination of
the third party surely enhances the convenience for the
practical applications of QPC.
This result also serves as yet another example that two-
party cryptography can enjoy the advantage of the DI
scenario too, so that its security can be even more reliable
than their DD counterparts. It is also interesting to study
in future works whether the method can be applied to
quantum private query (QPQ) [44–46], which is another
kind of multi-party secure computation protocols that
became a hot topic recently due to its great practical
significance.
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